

25 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Parrott

SUBJECT : Interim Handling of TOD Data

1. Much of the CIA data that will be prepared for the TOD, especially that related to the Clandestine Services or from any other contributor relating to [ ] activities, is inherently sensitive in nature and its protection is particularly a responsibility of the DCI. We in NIPE cannot control what DOD does with the data obtained from the organizations under its control but we can hold the line as an interim measure insofar as trades between CIA data and DOD data are concerned.

2. In any event I have recommended to [ ] that until we can develop a satisfactory control system for TOD data, the policy will continue that CIA data will not be given to anyone outside the Agency, except the immediate NIPE Staff; this goes for the DOD and BOB members of the TOD committee. The kind of control system that will be needed cannot be developed until we have a very clear picture as to what people are to get the TOD data, especially the individual contributions from CIA, DIA, etc., and what use they are going to make of such data. Uncoordinated use of TOD data by DOD elements at the Sec Def level to justify or cut down the programs proposed by DOD organizations, and/or by the BOB to recommend cuts in programs, would be in my view a highly undesirable situation. Uncoordinated use of DOD data by the CIA would be equally undesirable.

3. I have a feeling that this policy will not be looked on with favor by [ ] so, in order to save wear and tear on their respective nervous systems, I suggest that we not burden them with the details of this policy for the time being but simply retain CIA's TOD data within the confines of its PPB until a satisfactory solution to the problem of its secure handling within the "TOD Community" can be worked out.

[ ]

INTERNAL USE ONLY